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CREDITOR'S RIGHTS-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-SECURITY AssIGNMENT OF 
CONTRACT PAYMENTS Vom IF AssIGNOR RETAINS CONTROL-An insolvent 
debtor, who owed some $3,500 on plaintiff's partially-collected judgment, 
executed an instrument assigning to another creditor, a bank, all moneys 
due and to become due to the debtor under an existing contract,t expressly 
as security for payment of the debtor's present and future indebtedness to 
the bank. The contract obligor was notified of the assignment, and there-
after the bank collected the amounts periodically accruing under the con-
tract. The bank applied part of these collected amounts to the balance 
that the debtor owed the bank. The rest was either handed over to the 
debtor or credited to his general account, upon which he was allowed to 
draw at will. In execution of his judgment, plaintiff garnished some $3,000 
in the contract obligor's possession which had accrued on the contract but 
had not yet been paid over to the bank pursuant to the assignment. When 
the obligor resisted garnishment by pleading the prior assignment, plaintiff 
sought to set aside the assignment as fraudulent, and the bank intervened. 
The trial court upheld the assignment and gave the bank priority to the 
extent of the amount the debtor owed it at the time of trial, allocating any 
surplus to the payment of plaintiff's judgment. On appeal, held, reversed. 
Since the debtor never lost control of the money purportedly assigned to 
the bank, the assignment was fraudulent in law as to the plaintiff, and the 
entire fund held by the obligor is payable to him. Dupree v. Quinn, (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1956) 290 S.W. (2d) 329. 
Although the reported facts might have supported a finding of actual 
intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors,2 the trial court made a 
contrary finding, so that the appellate court's invalidation of the assign-
ment was as a matter of law. The primary ground of decision was the 
doctrine which invalidates an assignment for security when the purported 
assignor retains control over the property to an extent inconsistent with or 
repugnant to a valid assignment. This rule was applied in Benedict v. 
l Courts differ as to the validity of a security transfer of rights arising in the future, 
but by analogy to the common law rule allowing transfers of things having "potential 
existence," a right to payment under an existing contract is assignable. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. R. S. Armstrong & Bro., 225 Ala. 276, 142 S. 576 (1932). Cf. 
Rockmore v. Lehman, (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 564. 
2 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1945) art. 3996. Among the badges of fraud were the 
following: insolvency of the debtor, known by the bank; plaintiff's outstanding judgment, 
known by the bank; other security for the debtor's loans, held by the bank. The latter 
circumstance prompted the court to suggest, as an alternate ground for decision, that there 
was no consideration for the assignment, and therefore it was presumptively fraudulent 
under Texas law. This is not overly convincing. Surely the assignment was not intended 
as a gift, and an assignment of present or future payments under a contract securing a 
continuing line of credit, with disclosed or undisclosed reservation of any surplus for the 
use of the debtor, has been held not fraudulent in law. Didier v. Patterson, 93 Va. 534, 
25 S.E. 661 (1896); Leitch v. Hollister, 4 N.Y. 211 (1850); Merillat v. Hensey, 221 U.S. 333 
(1911). Nor is exaction of excessive security necessarily fraudulent. Peoples-Pittsburgh 
Trust Co. v. Holy Family Polish National Catholic Church, 341 Pa. 390, 19 A. (2d) 360 
(1941). 
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Ratner,s where Justice Brandeis denied that the evil to be avoided was 
coextensive with the evil of ostensible ownership,4 but rather that the very 
fact that the assignor retained unfettered dominion and control was a 
conclusive touchstone of fraud.5 Dominion retained over assigned accounts 
receivable was held fatal, even though no ostensible ownership was in-
volved since the assignment was of intangibles. That decision, purporting 
to discover and apply New York law in a bankruptcy proceeding, has found 
widespread application in the field of non-notification accounts-receivable 
financing.6 It has been rejected by some states,7 and it is not absolutely 
clear whether the New York courts would apply it outside of bankruptcy 
situations.a The federal courts have applied the rule with varying degrees 
of strictness,9 so that what constitutes sufficient dominion retained by the 
assignor to invalidate the assignment is not altogether clear. For example, 
a non-notification hypothecation of receivables has been held to survive the 
rule if the assignor segregates the accounts as agent for the assignee,10 but 
fails if the assignor is allowed to use the collections for his own purposes.11 
The written assignment agreement is not controlling, as the courts will 
infer the terms of an actual agreement from the actions of the parties.12 
a 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
4 "It rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession retained, but upon a 
lack of ownership because of dominion reserved." Id. at 363. 
5 See Brown v. Leo, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 350; Lee v. State Bank &: Trust Co., (2d 
Cir. 1930) 38 F. (2d) 45; 85 A.L.R. 216 at 222 (1933). 
6 But see In re M. J. Hoey &: Co., (2d Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 764, applying the rule to 
an assignment of stock exchange seat. See generally, comment, "Accounts Receivable as 
Collateral Security," 44 YALE L.J. 639 (1935). A substantial, but not exhaustive, investiga-
tion bas disclosed no use of the doctrine to invalidate an assignment with contemporary 
notice to the obligor. 
7 In re United Fuel and Supply Co., 250 Mich. 325, 230 N.W. 164 (1930). Contra, 
Stulz-Sickles Co. v. Fredbum Constr. Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 475, 169 A. 27 (1933). In general, 
states like Michigan, which allowed freehanded chattel mortgages prior to Benedict v. 
Ratner, note 3 supra, tend not to follow that decision, while states like New York, which 
invalidated such mortgages [2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, rev. ed., 
§583a (1940)], tend to adopt it. REPORT OF NEW YORK I.Aw REvlsION COMMISSION FOR 1946, 
p. 491 (Communication and Study relating to Assignments of Accounts Receivable, Legis. 
Doc. No. 65K at 140, 141). See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §691.906, expressly allowing 
collection of assigned accounts and use of proceeds by assignor, despite absence of record-
ing and/or notice to obligor. See note 13 infra. 
8 REPORT OF NEW YORK I.Aw REvlsION COMMISSION, note 7 supra, at 489. 
9 See remarks of Chief Judge Hutcheson in Second Nat. Bank of Houston v. Phillips, 
(5th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 115. 
10 Chapman v. Emerson, (4th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 353 (1925), goes far in upholding 
the transaction even though the assignor used some collections for his own purposes. But 
see In re Almond-Jones Co., (D.C. Md. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 152, affd. sub nom. Union Trust 
Co. v. Peck, (4th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 986. 
11 In re Fergusson Drug Co., (E.D. Pa. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 206, affd. sub nom. Marko-
vitz v. Taylor, (3d Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 782. Validity of the entire transaction may depend 
upon assignor's substituting accounts for ones collected and used for bis own purposes, 
Compare Coppard v. Martin, (5th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 743, with City Nat. Bank of Beau-
mont v. Zorn, (5th Cir. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 566. 
12 Lee v. State Bank &: Trust Co., note 5 supra. For elaboration of the wavering lines 
drawn between close cases and general disapproval of the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner, 
note 3 supra, see Cohen and Gerber, "Mortgages of Accounts Receivable," 29 Gro. L.J. 
555 (1941). 
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Despite the highly conceptual nature of this test of "dominion" which is 
"repugnant" to a valid transfer, there may be real, or at least potential, 
evils justifying it. Since recording requirements for mortgages of goods 
and chattels are not applicable to intangibles, creditors typically have no 
way of discovering a debtor's hypothecation of his accounts.ts Further-
more, opportunity for a debtor to execute an antedated assignment in col-
lusion with a friendly creditor is real when nothing other than the instru-
ment is required for a valid assignment. Finally, any rule which increases 
the estate available to all creditors, albeit by defeating the special creditor's 
advantage, arguably has some merit. Yet it may be questioned whether 
the rule of conclusive invalidity should be extended to a case like the 
present where the obligor of the assigned contract was notified, and where 
all collections were made by the assignee. These circumstances would seem 
to negate "dominion," since the actual funds were completely out of the 
debtor's hands14 and there was no secrecy. The arrangement in the princi-
pal case is explainable on legitimate grounds far short of fraud. If, with-
out any assignment, the debtor had received cash payments from his contract 
obligor, preferential payment of this cash to the bank would have been 
permissible even if payments exceeded the debt owed the bank.15 Instead, the 
payments were due from the obligor at specific future times, and in the ab-
sence of ability to pay them over presently, the debtor assigned them to 
the bank.1 6 Assignment of the entire amount of the' then unliquidated 
13 A number of states have passed statutes validating assignments of accounts either 
with or without recording requirements. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§691.901 to 
691.911. Texas Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1947) art. 260-1, provides permissive validation 
by filing notice of intention to assign accounts, which leaves open the question whether 
the assignment can be validated in any other way such as by notification to the obligor. 
See Koessler, "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts Receiv-
able," 44 MICH. L. REv. 563 at 603 (1946). This statute has not been construed by the 
Texas courts and was not mentioned in the present case, but two federal decisions indi-
cate that filing pursuant to the statute in the present case would have immunized the 
assignment from attack. Second Nat. Bank of Houston v. Phillips, note 9 supra; In re 
Cumings, (S.D. Tex. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 690. See generally Hanna, "The Extension of 
Public Recordation," 31 COL. L REv. 617 at 623 to 630 (1931). 
141n re Monumental Shoe Mfg. Co., (D.C. Md. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 549, held Benedict v. 
Ratner, note 3 supra, inapplicable where the assignor collected all accounts, but paid 
them to the assignee bank, which then drew a check and deposited it in the assignor's 
account, retaining the right to apply such payments to the assignor's debt. 
15 Collections deposited to debtor's account would be subject to the bank's right of 
set-off to the extent of outstanding loans, nowithstanding the debtor's insolvency. Citizens' 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Yantis, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 287 S.W. 505. Any surplus would re-
main available to other creditors. See Didier v. Patterson, note 2 supra. Such a set-off 
might well be a voidable preference in bankruptcy, on the ground the deposits were made 
with the purpose of creating a preference. Union Trust v. Peck, note 10 supra; Blue v. 
Herkimer Nat. Bank, (2d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 256. Outside of bankruptcy, payment and 
receipt of a preference are not necessarily fraudulent. Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74 (1880). 
16 Upholding this assignment would, of course, allow the bank, with the debtor's 
cooperation, to obtain a lien on his property prior to the time the judgment could garnish, 
since only sums presently due may be garnished, Medley v. American Radiator Co., (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1901) 66 S.W. 86, while future payments under an existing contract are assign-
able. Note 1 supra. If this is unfortunate at all, it is so quite independently from, and 
beyond cure by, the doctrine applied in the present case. 
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future payments was convenient, since the excess could be credited to the 
debtor's checking account, and was in fact necessary to avoid splitting the 
obligor's debt between two payees. Moreover, it is important to note that 
application of Benedict v. Ratner in its typical bankruptcy setting destroys 
the assignee's lien and thereby increases the bankrupt debtor's estate to be 
shared by all creditors, whereas invalidation of the transfer on suit of a 
judgment creditor, as in the principal case, merely shifts a preference from 
one individual creditor to another. It seems questionable to apply the con-
ceptual rule of "dominion retained" to the present case where dominion 
over collections was not really retained by the assignor, where the rule serves 
a single creditor rather than all creditors, and where the possibility of an 
antedated assignment is negated by contemporary notice to the obligor. In 
any case, numerous statutes validating, or setting forth means of perfecting, 
assignments of accounts17 provide assignors an escape from the entire doc-
trine. 
John A. Beach, S.Ed. 
17 See note 13 supra. 
